نتایج جستجو برای: Iran. JEL Classification: D85

تعداد نتایج: 602892  

Journal: :iranian economic review 0
mohsen nazari faculty of management of university of tehran tahmorath hasangholipour faculty of management of university of tehran gholamreza soleimani marketing management and pharmaceutical sciences branch, islamic azad university professor, tehran, iran ezatollah abbasian hamadan, bu-ali sina university seyed mojtaba moussavi neghabi faculty of management, university of tehran

o ne of the effective strategies for economic development of clusters is the conduct of networking activities by cluster members. indeed, the majority of cluster members are micro and small enterprises, so, should attempt to overcome their inherent constraints and influence the market through networking activities. in addition, these enterprises lack an intra-firm research and development unit ...

Journal: :Games and Economic Behavior 2014
Christian W. Bach Elias Tsakas

Article history: Received 29 March 2013 Available online 10 February 2014 JEL classification: C72 D83 D85

2005
Hans Haller Jurjen Kamphorst Sudipta Sarangi

For the connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay, specific parameter configurations are given for which Nash networks do not exist. Moreover, existence and the scope of Nash network architectures are briefly discussed. JEL Classification: C72, D85

Journal: :CoRR 2017
Matthew O. Jackson

I provide a typology of social capital, breaking it down into seven more fundamental forms of capital: information capital, brokerage capital, coordination and leadership capital, bridging capital, favor capital, reputation capital, and community capital. I discuss how most of these forms of social capital can be identified using different network-based measures. JEL Classification Codes: D85, ...

2007
Hans Haller Jurjen Kamphorst Sudipta Sarangi

For the connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay, specific parameter configurations are given for which Nash networks do not exist. Moreover, existence and the scope of Nash network architectures are briefly discussed. JEL Classification Numbers C72 · D85

2008
pascal billand christophe bravard sudipta sarangi Jean Monnet

Galeotti et al. (2006, [2]) show that all minimal networks can be strict Nash in two-way flow models with full parameter heterogeneity while only inward pointing stars and the empty network can be strict Nash in the homogeneous parameter model of Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]). In this note we show that the introduction of partner heterogeneity plays a major role in substantially increasing the set...

2010
Pascal Billand Jean Monnet Christophe Bravard Sudipta Sarangi Hans Haller Matt Jackson Brian Rogers

In this paper, we examine the role played by heterogeneity in the connection model. In sharp contrast to the homogeneous cases we show that under heterogeneity involving only two degrees of freedom, all networks can be supported as Nash or efficient. Moreover, we show that there does not always exist Nash networks. However, we show that on reducing heterogeneity, both the earlier “anything goes...

2008
Pascal Billand Jean Monnet Christophe Bravard Sudipta Sarangi

Galeotti et al. (2006, [2]) show that all minimal networks can be strict Nash in two-way flow models with full parameter heterogeneity while only inward pointing stars and the empty network can be strict Nash in the homogeneous parameter model of Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]). In this note we show that the introduction of partner heterogeneity plays a major role in substantially increasing the set...

Journal: :Mathematical Social Sciences 2009
F. Deroian

We present a model of communication network formation in which links’ strengths are endogenously determined by individual incentives. Agents are endowed with a fixed amount of resource which they can distribute as they want in directed links. Individuals capture benefits from both direct and indirect access to others, in a way that takes into account the strength of each link. The wheel archite...

2017
Pascal Billand Christophe Bravard Sudipta Sarangi pascal billand christophe bravard sudipta sarangi

We provide existence results in a game with local spillovers where the payoff function satisfies both convexity and the strategic substitutes property. We show that there always exists a stable pairwise network in this game, and provide a condition which ensures the existence of pairwise equilibrium networks. Moreover, our existence proof allows us to characterize a pairwise equilibrium of thes...

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